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ABOUT PROPERTY IDENTITY 
Arnold Cusmariu 
W. V. Quine has objected that properties are phil-
osophically suspect on grounds that their identity 
conditions are obscure.! I consider this and related 
matters below. 
I 
It is a generally accepted doctrine that Leibniz's 
Law 
(LL) (x)(y)(x=y - (F)(Fx = Fy)) 
provides logically necessary conditions for the concept 
of identity. But for some reason, philosophers sometimes 
either overlook the intended breadth of LL or else do 
not take it seriously enough. For some philosophers, 
who happened to be interested at some particular time 
only in a certain class of objects,2 have felt compelled 
to formulate special conditions of identity for the 
entity of their choice, as if this was something they 
had to do over and above adherence to LL. 
Now, I have no objection against this extra work 
these philosophers want to do, as long as it is realized 
that it is just that: extra work. They aren't in the 
least required to do it to settle the identity issue for 
their entities. LL will do that. And this applies to 
any entity whatever philosophers may wish to study. 
Of course, it applies to properties too. Property 
Realists need do no extra work to deal with property 
identity either.3 Suitably construed LL will suffice. 
And once this is realized, identity conditions for 
properties become no more obscure than identity condi-
tions for anything else. Property Realists can simply 
use the Realist counterpart of LL, 
(PI) (F)(G)(F=G •* ( H X F exemplifies II = G exempli-
fies II))1' 
to settle the identity issue for properties. 
I ' l O 
Indeed, by comparison wilh PI, the usual approach 
to property identity^ 
(PI 1) (F)(G)(F=G (a)(b)((a expresses F 6 b expresses 
G) a is synonymous with 
b)) 
(where the innermost quantifiers range over open 
sentences), seems utterly misguided methodologically. 
There is little room for semantic considerations in a 
matter as exclusively ontological as identity. After 
all, when we ask whether the Evening Star and the 
Morning Star are identical we are not inclined to think 
the question should be answered seniantically. We 
answer it not by reflecting on the meaning of the ex-
pressions "the Evening Star" and "the Morning Star," or 
on the semantic relations which might hold between them, 
but by considering the Evening Star and the Morning 
Star, i_.e. , the objects themselves. 
Similarly here. When we ask about identity condi-
tions for properties we want the answer to bear on 
properties themselves not the holding of some semantic 
relation between open sentences which express them. 
That would be changing the subject. So then we must 
consider the objects themselves; provided we are prepared 
to put language and semantics aside and take properties 
qua objects seriously in the first place, as Plato did. 
(It is not surprising that Quine and Carnap, neither of 
whom ever took properties conceived as extra-linquistic 
objects seriously, are mainly responsible for the 
prominence of a semantic criterion for property iden-
tity.) 
II 
Why should philosophers find property identity 
problematic in the first place? Possibly as a result of 
the following process: (1) they replace the wholly 
ontological question "When are properties the same?" 
with the mainly semantic question "When do two open 
sentences express the same property?," which (2) they in 
turn replace with the wholly semantic question "When do 
two open sentences have the same meaning?" (Problems 
about proposition identity get started the same way.) 
So the search for a semantic criterion begins and ends 
quickly in obscurity when doubts about synonymy are 
raised. 
But there is no reason why we must think of proper-
ties as meanings. Plato didn't. Indeed, if doubts 
about synonymy are justified, we shouldn't so think of 
I'll 
properties. That is not to say that meaning is not rele-
vant to properties. It is, but only in that meaningful 
open sentences only can be said to express properties— 
a connection which hardly implies that properties must 
be meanings, and hence some sort of linguistic object. 
True, even though properties need not be meanings, 
they are still "intensions." Nothing more mysterious 
need be intended by this tag, howe ver, than that proper-
ties can be exemplified by all and only the same objects, 
i.e., have the same extension, without being the same, 
as is the case with being an equilateral triangle and 
being an equiangular triangle. How this can be so may 
be seen by recalling that properties are both exempli-
fiers and exemplifiees. We do not automatically specify 
all the properties a property can exemplify when we 
specify what exemplifies it. 6 
Ill 
I want now to consider four possible objections to 
what I have been saying. 
(i) "PI above is circular. To apply it we must 
already know what property is." 
Granted. PI by itself will not do as an account of 
what a property is. But it is not intended to. Such an 
account ought to be forthcoming from a full-blown theory 
of properties, not from a criterion of identity. It is 
not the business of a criterion of identity to specify 
the entity. As I have already attended to this matter 
elsewhere,' independently of PI, the cix-cularity ob-
jection will not work against me.8 
(ii) "Philosophers do need to do extra work to set-
tle the matter of identity for their entities because it 
is difficult to formulate general logically suf ficien t 
conditions for identity, in light of Wittgenstein's ob-
jection^ to Russell's definition of identity in 
Principia Hathematica 
«"13.01 x=y.=: (0) : 0 !x. O .0 !y Df 
later bolstered by Max Black's hypothesis 1 0 of a possible 
world of two indiscernibles." 
This is a more serious, but still answerable, ob-
jection. I don't think property Realists need worry 
that the converse of PI 
(PI*) (F)(6)((ll)(r exemplifies H = G exemplifies II) -
F=G) 
1 «t 2 
might turn out false. Wittgenstein's objection and 
Black's hypothesis have no force at all against proper-
ties. The possible world of two objects having all and 
only the same properties Black asks us to imagine is in 
fact incoherent if it is a world of any kind of non-
individual. Tor if this world contained non-individuals, 
it might contain, for example, two sets having all and 
only the same members (since two sets having all and 
only the same properties would also have all and only 
the same members). But surely this cannot be. 
But it seems to me that Black's world is incoherent 
even as a world of individuals. Russell was right to 
define identity as he did, for the following reason. 
A definition of identity must tell us not only when and 
only when we have one thing, but also when and only when 
we have two. That is, on the flip side of a definition 
of identity there must be one of diversity. 
Now, in so far as I understand what diversity is 
at all, it seems to me that if a is other than b, then 
there is a property one of them has which the other does 
not have (never mind how we could know this). That is 
what is mean t by saying that we have two things and not 
one. But then 
(LL*) (x)(y)((F)(Fx = Fy) + x=y) 
has to hold to give us the concept of diversity by 
transposition. In requiring that we give up the neces-
sity of LL* , Black's hypothesis simply robs us of our 
meaning postulate for diversity. What we are to put in 
its place or how we are to understand diversity without 
LL* I cannot imagine. Black certainly does not tell 
us. 11 
(iii) "Philosophers must still do extra work to 
settle the issue of identity for their entity, not 
because it is difficult to formulate adequate logically 
sufficient conditions for identity, but because such 
conditions must also be helpful. That is, they must 
tell us also how we are to determine in some particular 
case whether we have one tiling or two. But LL* and PI* 
do not do this . " 
In the present context the objection is irrelevant, 
as it raises not an ontological question but an epistemo-
logical one. Unlike the previous objection, the present 
one does not question the truth of LL* or related princi-
ples. It merely insists that all such principles be able 
to answer also the question "How do you know that here 
you have one. tiling and not two?" While this question is 
interesting and important, it is not one which the 
Realist must answer to deal with the ontological aspects 
1«I3 
of identity. It is, in general, bad method to attach an 
epistemological rider to a metaphysical question.12 
In any case, I don't see why LL* and PI* are not 
"helpful." According to these principles, if there is 
a property which a/F has and which b/G does not have, 
we have two things/properties. If there is no such 
property, we have one. This alone will not tell us 
what properties in particular would be needed or how 
we are to look for them, but presumably that should be 
the result of some honest toil and not merely a matter 
of direct inference from such general principles as LL* 
and PI*. (The extra work whose analytic value I ques-
tioned earlier might come in handy here.) 
(iv) "The principle LL* that indiscernibles are 
identical implies that an individual is nothing but a 
bundle of properties.13 But this view is absurd be-
cause it implies that individuals must be abstract. I1' 
Therefore, LL* is absurd." 
I agree it is absurd to think of individuals as 
mere bundles of properties. But I disagree that LL* 
implies this view. For, while on the present view LL* 
is not compatible with there being no properties, it is 
perfectly compatible with there being no sets (collec-
tions, bundles, etc.), of properties or anything else. 
Together with LL, LL* merely sets forth the meaning of 
identity, so that any proposition involving this con-
cept can be paraphrased wholly in terms of property co-
exemplification. Such a paraphrase neither dispenses 
with individuals, in favor of some other entity, nor 
identifies them with some other entity. It takes no 
stand at all on the nature of individuals. Except for 
identity, it leaves everything else the same. 
IV 
I have argued that there is nothing especially 
obscure about property identity. Whatever be the truth 
about identity—and here I have argued, with Russell, 
that Leibniz's Law and its converse jointly exhaust that 
truth--it holds equally for individuals and non-individ-
uals. The sole remaining mystery, if we can call it 
that, is epistemological. But that is a separate issue, 
which I may legitimately postpone for another occasion.1 ! 
Salve Regina College 
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